Mr Clarke's speech was heavy on practical examples of how Britain has influenced the rest of the community how it has pressed to free

Mr Clarke's speech was heavy on practical examples of how Britain has influenced the rest of the community, how it has pressed to free up markets and how the British government was crucial in turning the single market into reality quickly. Mr Davies, by contrast, underlined business's preoccupation with the hard slog of seeing through the enlargement of Europe, completing the single market, reforming competition policy, putting a bomb under the eurocrats to improve their efficiency, improving the accountability of the European parliament, and dealing with changes in social and environment policy.The risk of withdrawing from Europe was threefold: loss of access to markets that take 60 per cent of our exports; a reduction in foreign investment in the UK, and the probability that we would be obliged, in practice, "still to dance to the European Union tune, while not being included in the orchestra".He was cautious about the single currency, pointing out that only a quarter of his members thought it was necessary for a single market - though at the other extreme only a small proportion thought it would be positively damaging for business. Coincidentally, the same message was b eing delivered by Howard Davies, director-general of the Confederation of British Industry, at a rather less prestigious dinner in Norwich Both speeches are broadly in tune with the views of Eddie George, the Governor of the Bank of England, whose pragmatic, cautious, but fundamentally positive attitude - in the long term - towards monetary union was spelt out a few days ago. His views are shared by the vast bulk of big business in this country. It may be possible to accuse the Trust of treachery, but bad judgement, no.. Kenneth Clarke was preaching to the converted when he refused to dance to the Euro-sceptic tune at last night's European Movement dinner.

To the Trust's mind it has created a situation that is more conducive to a rival and higher offer than any of the alternatives.At the same time it guarantees itself a 20 per cent increase in capital value and a 30 per cent increase in annual income, allowing it to overtake the Medical Research Council as the biggest funder of medical research in the country. No rival is going to bid if it cannot surpass the 90 per cent acceptance level which allows it compulsory purchase of the rest. The key to the whole thing is that, under the terms of the agreement, Glaxo is prevented from buying in the market to shut out the higher bid.The effect is doubly beneficial to the Trust for it also prevents Glaxo buying the 10 per cent stake it is entitled to under takeover rules merely to fustrate rivals. If a higher offer emerges after it comes into force, other shareholders would reject Glaxo's offer and it would lapse. To the Trust's mind it was creating the opportunity for an auction while at the same time guaranteeing itself an exit at a minimum level of £10.25 a share.The irrevocable undertaking is in any case largely an irrelevance. On top of a high price, the Trust managed to extract a number of important concessions, including a five-week stay on its irrevocable acceptance. Furthermore, it threatened that, without the Trust's irrevocable and immediate undertaking to accept, it would walk away.

Far from failing to execute its fiduciary duties, the Trust seems to have been meticulous in its attention to them Glaxo's opening offer to the Trust was a good deal lower. He is a good friend of Glaxo's chief executive, Sir Richard Sykes. If he could deliver Glaxo as a long-term client, it would more than justify the reputed golden hello Fleming is said to have lured him from Barings with.This is all good conspiratorial stuff, but there is a rather more innocent explanation for what occurred. Who were its advisers, Robert Fleming, working for: the Trust or Glaxo? Fleming's big hitter on the case, Bernard Taylor, makes it look doubly suspicious.